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Does the pandemic require derogation from human rights treaties? This question has
sparked significant debate, notably spurred by Alan Greene’s provocative argument
that failing to derogate would denature ordinary human rights law and leave the start
and end points of the crisis unclear. Others disagree: Scheinin argues the principle
of normalcy, contained in General Comment 29, should continue to apply. Only
where ordinary human rights provide inadequate flexibility should derogation be
considered, and even then the principle should continue to limit the derogations.
Several analyses have complemented this debate, analysing the ECtHR’s practice
(Molloy), the detail of the European derogations save San Marino’s (Zghibarta),
the prospect of enhanced political supervision of derogation particularly following
PACE Resolution 2209 (2018) (Epure), the mechanics of notification under the
ECHR (Holcroft-Emmess) and the overarching Treaty frameworks (Emmons). The
UN Human Rights Committee itself has weighed in, issuing a statement criticising
aspects of Covid-19 derogation practice on 24 April.
This post seeks to complement this debate in two ways. First, it will summarise the
state practice during this crisis, mapping the derogations to date from European,
American and international human rights systems (I). Second, it will draw some
tentative conclusions from this practice (II).
This partly intends to serve as a starting point for future empirical research which will
no doubt exhaustively analyse how far derogation is correlated with the severity of
the virus, the restrictiveness of measures and other factors (compare Hafner-Burton
et al.). Such research is already underway as to national states of emergency. It
will also bring into the above debate the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR), whose derogation practice has been neglected until now. For a good
overview of the Inter-American system’s approach to the crisis more broadly, see
Piovesan and Morales Antoniazzi.
I. The derogations
As of 1 May 2020, and based on the information available on the relevant websites:
• 10 of 47 states (21%) have notified derogations from the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR);
• 11 of 23 states (48%) have notified suspensions of guarantees under the ACHR;
and
• 14 of 173 states (8%) have notified derogations from the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 12 of these are states which are also party
to, and have derogated from the ECHR or ACHR; one (Colombia) has ended its
derogation as of 17 April.
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A brief remark on the ACHR’s derogation regime is necessary. Whilst art.27 ACHR
uses the word ‘suspension’ rather than derogation, the rights in question are not
‘suspended’. The regime operates indistinguishably from derogation, with particular
measures needing to be strictly necessary in the particular context: C-275 J v. Peru
paras 124-147; C-289 Espinoza Gonzáles para 132. This post will use the terms
interchangeably. See further Emmons on the limits of derogations.
Figure 1 sets out the derogations to date in tabular form. Where the derogated
provisions were not specified in the letter notifying derogation but are apparent from
the attached laws, this is indicated by ‘(in Decree)’; where this does not appear, the
letter itself includes the detail. For simplicity and consistency, where a notification
letter specifies the end dates of relevant laws or a state of emergency, this is taken
as the projected end of the derogation (even where a state says it will send a further
notification when the derogation ends).
(You can download the graph here.)
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Figure 1
* Argentina’s first letter singles out its border controls, and recitals 5-7 of Decree
313/2020 can be read as implying that it is these measures that require suspension
whereas other measures (such as internal movement restrictions) can be justified
as ordinary restrictions. But this is unclear, and it also includes details on its state
of emergency and the relevant Decrees, leaving it unclear whether those measures
require derogation.
** Bolivia’s third letter specifically refers to the ordinary restriction provisions of these
articles (arts. 7(2), 16(2) and 22(3)), leaving it unclear whether the intention is to
suspend or not. Similarly, Chile, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala’s letters
refer to restrictions (rather than suspensions) of the relevant articles.
*** Guatemala’s second letter states that ‘the measures restricting articles 13, 15 and
22 [ACHR] continue in force’ and the attached decree refers to no new measures.
However, this may be a mistake: the first and third notifications in fact only refer
to articles 15 and 22, and the second letter uses identical language to the others
(‘which concern the freedom of assembly and movement’).
**** Honduras’ first notification’s first attached Decree refers to earlier measures in
force from 16-21 March which suspended additional constitutional rights (art. 13 and
further aspects of art.7 ACHR) to those suspended from 21 March onwards. The
second notification includes its only decree to refer to international human rights;
interestingly, it cites arts 11 and 13 ACHR (and arts 4, 17 and 19 ICCPR) in respect
of restrictions on the dissemination of photographs, interviews or personal data of
Coronavirus victims without their express consent.
Figure 2 sets out the most commonly-invoked derogations or suspensions. Where
rights are cited but it is unclear whether the intention is to derogate, the table errs on
the side of assuming derogation.
(You can download the graph here.)
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II. Analysis
Three patterns are immediately apparent.
First, the identification of derogated provisions varied. Only five of the eleven states
complied with the obligation to state which ACHR rights were suspended (art.27(3)
ACHR; C-166 Zambrano Vélez et al. v Ecuador paras 69-70); of these five, one
(Argentina) was particularly ambiguous as to its scope and the remainder (Bolivia,
Chile, Dominican Republic and Guatemala) stated that they were restricting, not
suspending, the rights. Conversely, the majority of ECHR states did clearly identify
the derogated provisions, despite this not being strictly required (art.15(3) ECHR;
#ahin Alpay v. Turkey para 73). And all states identified the derogated ICCPR
provisions, including those that had failed to do so in their regional notifications
(Armenia, Romania, San Marino Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador and Peru) and
despite the less binding nature of Human Rights Committee Views (van Alebeek
and Nollkaemper, p. 383). The importance of identifying provisions will be returned
to below, but an immediate point is that this paradoxical variation requires further
attention. It perhaps suggests that fear of subsequent judicial sanction plays a limited
role in eliciting precision and that other factors (perhaps use of templates and/or
contemporary control by the Secretary General) are more important.
Second, regional derogations frequently appeared to be conceived of as ancillary
to constitutional derogation. In other words, several states seemed primarily to
analyse their state of emergency and consequent restrictions under constitutional
law, and assumed that such restrictions entailed derogation from international
human rights law. For instance, no fewer than eight states (Armenia, Romania,
Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama and Peru) referred to restricted
constitutional rights without any express reference to ECHR or ACHR ones. Where
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states referred to international and constitutional right derogations, the lists were
typically identical (Albania, Georgia, Argentina). This is also evident in states’
language: almost all notifications refer to the national state of emergency, the
(typically national) rights restriction this entails and the prescribed period of these
national measures (see, for instance, Estonia and El Salvador), leaving it implicit
that the human rights derogation is coterminous with these. Such references to
international human rights law’s requirements as are made consist of stock phrases
about non-derogable rights, non-discrimination and respect for proportionality (see
e.g. El Salvador (though cf. art.2 of the attached Decree) and North Macedonia’s
first notification). Chile is the exception that proves these rules: its letter alone
distinguished between constitutional and international human rights, and expressly
noted that derogation will end earlier than the state of emergency if possible.
On one view, this practice suggests certain states agree with Greene: they view
derogation as a natural result of a state of emergency. On another, this practice
is seriously problematic: it suggests a failure to conduct a separate human rights
analysis to determine whether the restriction of constitutional rights in fact requires
derogation from international human rights law. This violates the principle of
normalcy and risks states taking extremely restrictive measures without a clear view
on what human rights allows or prohibits. This brings us to the final point.
Third, there is a striking lack of consistency in practice. It is true that the majority
of derogating states derogate from freedom of movement and freedom of meeting/
association. Yet those states still remain a minority, with the great majority of states
globally having not derogated despite imposing equally or still more drastic lockdown
measures. Almost half of ACHR states have derogated whereas only a fifth of
ECHR ones have, and only two states derogated from the ICCPR without a regional
derogation. This pattern requires further exploration. The ACHR notifications are
particularly vague and focussed on national constitutional rights, as outlined above,
which may explain in part the higher rate.
Nine states derogate from regional rights without derogating from the equivalent
ICCPR provisions (Albania, N. Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Argentina, Bolivia,
the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Panama). Some states provide details
on every law that has been passed, with Colombia providing no fewer than seven
notifications; others send a high-level law that empowers state authorities to take
measures (e.g. Moldova) or send nothing at all (San Marino, Serbia); and most
fall in between, providing some but not all detail. A number of states’ notifications
are patchy (notably Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras and Serbia) despite the
requirement to notify all relevant measures.
The most striking shortcoming, however, is that states provide little to no explanation
as to why derogation, rather than restriction, is necessary. Only Argentina’s
highly unclear notification appeared to draw a line between measures requiring
suspension and measures requiring restriction. Indeed, some states’ notifications
appear to conflate derogation and restriction (Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic,
Guatemala). This is perhaps understandable: the majority of the rights in play are
ordinary qualified one, and it is quite unclear what derogation adds to the ordinary
proportionality test (see Simpson p. 875). Difficult and uncertain legal analysis is
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required to determine the limits of the ordinary rights law (Coghlan, McBride). One
can sympathise with Estonia’s vague statement that ‘some of these measures may
involve a derogation from certain obligations’. Derogation might then be seen as a
‘backup’: states take the measures they consider necessary and derogate, granting
them further leeway in case it turns out the measures were not justifiable under the
ordinary tests.
Yet this undermines a key purpose of notification, which is to ‘prevent the abuse
of the exceptional powers…and allo[w] other State Parties to evaluate if the scope
of this suspension is consistent with the provisions of the Convention.’ (Zambrano
Vélez, para 70; compare General Comment 29, para 17). Scholars have placed
great emphasis on this role in the current debate, with Greene stressing the
‘transparency, additional oversight and supervision’ derogation allows, Holcroft-
Emmess noting it ‘promotes transparency and adherence to the rule of law’
and Scheinin accepting that notification ‘may have the positive effect of taming
emergency powers by constraining the State to articulate their emergency measures
under the terms of necessity, proportionality, exigency in the situation, temporality
and a commitment to human rights as a framework for legitimate emergency
measures’.
If notifications fail to articulate which aspects of their measures exceed ordinary
human rights law so as to require derogation, and why that derogation is necessary
in the circumstances, then notification fails to achieve this. Rather than requiring
states to apply a human rights lens and facilitating public debate between states
as to the limits of rights and derogations here, notification collapses into the roles
described above: an afterthought to constitutional analysis, a backup, or even a
simple public relations device to signal that the situation is being taken seriously (for
those derogating) or that draconian measures do not violate rights (for those not
derogating: compare Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, p. 810).
III. Conclusion
This leads to two thoughts by way of closing. First, should the regional courts and
Treaty bodies be stricter as to derogation’s procedural requirements? Perhaps.
The case-law to date has at least encouraged relatively timely notification and, in
most cases, at least some level of detail as to the measures taken. See particularly
Espinoza Gonzáles para 120 emphasising the importance of these steps in allowing
contemporaneous national court control. But international courts will not review
these notifications for many years, and at that point will need to strike a balance
between procedural rigour and justice (as well as respect for the state sovereignty
underpinning derogation) in the individual case. It is in particular difficult to see how
courts and Treaty bodies could directly control the state’s previous legal analysis of
the restriction/derogation boundary.
Second, then, this analysis perhaps reinforces arguments that stronger
contemporaneous control by the regional organs, Secretaries General, other states
and NGOs is required (notably Epure; and Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, pp. 831-2).
This requires scrutiny that measures are consistently reported; that the line between
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constitutional rights, human rights restriction and human rights derogation is clearly
articulated and justified; and that the derogations in play and their relationship with
the measures is clear from the notification letters themselves. Where a number of
states have considered measures to require derogation, it may conversely require
scrutiny of those states that have failed to derogate despite taking similar measures.
The Human Rights Committee’s statement, referred to above and reminding States
parties not to derogate where restriction suffices, is a first step in this process. In
this way, notification of derogation might come closer to achieving the crucial aim of
ensuring international, contemporary transparency.
The author wishes to thank Professor Martin Scheinin for his comments on a draft of
this post.
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